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THE STANDARD OF CARE IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
CLAIMS, CLINICAL PRACTICE GUIDELINES, AND
MANAGED CARE: TOWARDS A THERAPEUTIC HARMONY?
DANIEL W. SHUMAN*
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE STANDARD OF CARE IN MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE CLAIMS IN AN ERA OF FEE FOR SERVICE HEALTH CARE
The goal of the tort system is to reduce the level of injury and disability
in society, which it seeks to achieve through tort judgments that deter unsafe
conduct and compensate people injured by that unsafe conduct.' Negli-
gence,2 the basis for most medical malpractice tort claims, reflects this goal.
To prevail in a medical malpractice action based in negligence, the claimant
must convince the fact finder by a preponderance of the evidence that the
health care provider, who owed a duty to the claimant, violated the applica-
ble standard of care, thereby proximately causing injury to the claimant?
Thus, in order for the tort system to operate as a vehicle to determine liabil-
ity and to communicate what society regards as reasonable behavior for oth-
ers in similar situations, it is necessary to articulate clearly a standard of
care in malpractice litigation.
In the absence of legislation that defines what society expects of its
members, what is commonly referred to as negligence per se4 (e.g., a traffic
law that prohibits driving over 15 mph in a school zone communicates soci-
ety's judgment that the standard of care is that it is unreasonable to drive
over 15 mph in a school zone), courts have generally been unwilling to heed
Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University School of Law, Dallas, Texas. Work
on this essay was supported by a grant from the M.D. Anderson Research Foundation. Paul
Appelbaum, Robert Anderton, Tom Mayo, Barry Morenz, and David Wexler provided ex-
tremely helpful comments on an earlier draft for which I am deeply indebted.
1. See Daniel W. Shuman, The Psychology of Deterrence in Tort Law, 42 U. KAN. L.
REv. 115 (1993).
2. "[N]egligence is conduct which falls below the standard established by law for the
protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
282 (1977).
3. See ic § 281.
4. See id § 286.
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Oliver Wendell Holmes' admonition to crystallize standards that express the
collective wisdom of decision making in similar cases.5 Jurors, the decision
maker in most medical malpractice cases,6 are not informed of or guided by
the insights of decisions in similar cases. To the contrary, the inability or
unwillingness to put aside knowledge of other decisions may result in a ju-
ror's disqualification. The judicial system's sole formal guidance to jurors
for assessing the adequacy of care typically comes in the form of a standard
medical malpractice jury instruction. A common set of instructions informs
juries in malpractice cases that "thte duty of the professional [is] to use such
skill, prudence and diligence as other members of his profession commonly
possess and exercise."' This instruction hardly informs the jury more than
to say that we should expect health care professionals to act the way that
reasonable health care professionals usually act. Thus, the standards for
judging appropriate medical practice tend to be case specific, informed by
competing partisan experts employed by the parties.
This uncrystallized approach to setting the standard of care in medical
malpractice cases has three failings. First, this approach may encourage
health care professionals to employ costly, medically unnecessary, and often
legally uncalled for procedures that expose patients to an additional set of
risks (i.e., defensive medicine) because health care professionals lack clear
guidance about the legal system's expectations of them. The use of case-
specific standards leads health care professionals to shape their professional
practice by relying on a hodgepodge of incomplete, inaccurate, or inconsis-
tent information about settlements and jury verdicts, which are not formally
collected, analyzed, and communicated to health care professionals.' Sec-
ond, tlis approach may encourage the institution of marginal claims by
failing to provide lawyers with clear, consistent standards about what is ex-
pected of health care professionals. Ethically, if not financially, lawyers are
compelled to be zealous advocates for their clients and thus inevitably inter-
pret unclear, inconsistent standards of care in favor of the viability of their
client's claims. Third, this approach may increase the risk of both false
positive and false negative errors in assessing violations of the standard of
care by failing to provide legal decision makers with clear guidance about
the standard of care.9 In the absence of clear, consistent standards, judges
5. OLivER W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAw 127-29 (1881). See Carol M. Rose,
Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REv. 577, 577-79 (1988).
6. See Neil Vidmar, Empirical Evidence on the Deep Pockets Hypothesis: Jury Awards
for Pain and Suffering in Medical Malpractice Cases, 43 DuKE L.J. 217 (1993).
7. Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 772 (Cal. 1992).
8. See Shuman, supra note 1, at 124.
9. The Harvard Medical Practice Study which reviewed records of 31,000 patients re-
vealed both sets of errors. While approximately 400,000 patients are injured through medical
negligence each year, fewer than 50,000 malpractice claims are brought. Thus, far too few
claims are brought. It is estimated that two-thirds of these claims did not involve negligently
caused injuries. Thus, most of the claims were brought in the wrong cases. See David M.
Studdert & Troyen A. Brennan, Deterrence in a Divided World: Emerging Problems for
[Vol. 34
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and juries alike are more likely to be influenced by a multitude of extra-
legal factors that may skew their decisions."
However serendipitous the decision to set the standard of care in this
fashion may seem when viewed in isolation, in context there is a logic to it.
Reflecting the felt necessities of the time, this individualized post hoe ap-
proach to ascertain the standard of care for determining the tort liability of
health care providers reflects the practice of fee for service medicine. Just
as quality considerations dominated cost considerations in medical decision
making in the practice of fee for service medicine, quality considerations
have also dominated cost considerations in the tort liability standard for
medical malpractice claims that evolved in that era. Although the standard
of care asked the decision maker to assume a foresight perspective consid-
ering only the circumstances known at the time of the conduct examined,
the decision maker enjoyed the benefit of hindsight. 2 From this hindsight
perspective, asking jurors to assess the reasonableness of the physician's
actions on a case-by-case basis skewed cost benefit considerations. It fo-
cused on the known harmful outcome to this plaintiff rather than the cost-
benefit analysis to the plaintiff as a member of the class of persons at risk.
With knowledge that the costs of medically necessary care were generally
absorbed by health care insurers,"3 the jury was free to determine, without
the limitation of crystallized standards, what it thought was then medically
Malpractice Law in an Era of Managed Care, 15 BEHAV. SCd. & L. 21, 26-27 (1997).
10. See generally DANIEL KAHNEMAN Er AL., JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEU-
Ris'ncs AND BIAsEs (1982).
11.
The general test in malpractice litigation against health care professionals is
whether the defendant adhered to prevailing professional standards in pro-
viding care. This judicial reinforcement of professional norms endorses at
least implicitly the values that underlie the fee-for-service model of health
care. As a result, historically, ethical, legal, and financing principles were
largely congruent.
John Petrilla, Symposium: Ethics, Money, and The Problem of Coercion in Managed Behav-
ioral Health Care, 40 ST. Louis U. L.J. 359, 381 (1996).
12. See Norman G. Poythress Jr., Negligent Release Litigation: A Proposal for Proce-
dural Reform, 17 J. PsYCHIATRY & L. 595 (1989); David B. Wexler & Robert F. Schopp,
How and When to Correct for Juror Hindsight Bias in Mental Health Law Malpractice Liti-
gation: Some Preliminary Observations, 7 BEHAv. Sci. & L. 485 (1989)
13.
Since the growth of employer-provided health insurance after World War II,
health professionals generally have been free to order for their patients any
accepted diagnostic procedure or treatment, knowing that third-party payers
would cover the costs. Thus, clinicians had both the obligation to determine
what care their patients reasonably required and the power to provide or oth-
erwise obtain that care.
Paul S. Appelbaum, Legal Liability and Managed Care, 48 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 251, 252
(1993).
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necessary and, therefore what should have been done.14 Just as the treating
physician was largely unencumbered by cost considerations in the delivery
of care, the factfinder was also largely unencumbered by cost considerations
in assessing the adequacy of care.
Whatever sense this approach may have made to setting the standard of
care in an era of fee for service medicine, the potential conflict that may
arise is obvious when this approach is applied in an era of managed care.
Physicians whose practice is now dominated by cost considerations are
judged by a standard that does not reflect these cost considerations. Indeed,
the court in Wickline v. State,5 one of the few decisions that addresses a
physician's duty to a patient in light of the limitations of a managed care
plan, noted that managed care should "not be permitted to corrupt medical
judgment,"' 6 implying that the physician's duty to the patient should not be
altered by the nature of the managed care plan. Subsequently, in Wilson v.
Blue Cross of Southern California," the California Court of Appeal again
noted that the physician's duty of care should not be dictated by fiscal con-
siderations. This case involved a fmalpractice claim following a patient's
suicide because he had been discharged based on Blue Cross' refusal to
authorize the full recommended four weeks of psychiatric hospitalization. 8
There has been little change in what society expects of health care pro-
viders as manifested in malpractice law to reflect the structural changes in
health care delivery. 9 But, there may exist a potential vehicle to address
many of these problems to the satisfaction of both the health care and the
legal professions: clinical practice guidelines. Clinical practice guidelines
offer the possibility of clear, consistent standards of cost effective care. Are
these clinical practice guidelines a potential boon to the courts and the
health care professions? If so, why have the health care professions been so
concerned about their development, and why has the legal system not em-
braced their use in malpractice claims?
14.
Together, these rules suggest a certain image of medical decisionmaking, one
in which physicians may only consider therapeutic benefits and harms; judg-
ments of cost-effectiveness are out-of-bounds. There is no general 'Learned
Hand test' in malpractice law that requires physicians to provide those tests
and treatments (and only those tests and treatments) that are cost-benefit justi-
fled. Indeed, the law seems to view all economic calculations as a threat to the
delicate fiduciary relationship between healer and patient.
Jonathan J. Frankel, Note, Medical Malpractice Law and Health Care Cost Containment:
Lessonsfor Refonnersfrom the Clash of Cultures, 103 YALE L.J. 1297, 1317 (1994).
15. Wickline v. State, 192 Cal. App. 3d 1630 (1986).
16. Id. at 1647.
17. Wilson v. Blue Cross of S. Cal., 271 Cal. Rptr. 876 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
18. See id.
19. See Studdert & Brennan, supra note 9, at 26-27; Petrilla, supra note 11, at 380.
[Vol. 34
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II. THE EVOLUTION OF CLINICAL PRACTICE GUIDELINES
"[C]linical practice guidelines (CPGs) are [ideally] sets of suggestions,
commonly set forth as decision rules, that reflect informed opinion on how
to treat a certain illness or condition. CPGs are generally derived from sci-
entific studies comparing the effectiveness of various clinical approaches to
treating a particular medical situation.""0 The impetus for CPGs arose from
observations of wide ranging variations in regional practices and the desire
to determine and inform practitioners what works best and what does not."
By ascertaining and encouraging the use of tests and procedures that work
and discouraging those that do not, CPGs offered the opportunity to im-
prove the quality of health care and, additionally, to contain its cost.'
Although clinical practice guidelines were initially driven by concerns
with the quality of care, currently their use by managed care plans is often
driven by concerns with the cost of care. As cost-benefit considerations
have come to dominate the provision of health care, managed care plans
have increasingly utilized clinical practice guidelines to guide a provider's
decision makingY "[G]uidelines can provide a basis on which to pay for
services as well as to assess and evaluate practitioner and health system per-
formance."'24 In many instances, managed practice plan providers agree to
be bound by guidelines in ordering tests and procedures. This shift in ori-
entation has fueled many physicians' fears that CPGs are a threat to physi-
cian autonomy.'
A significant consideration in this fear is who authors the guidelines.
Presently, there are three sources of guidelines-governmental entities, pro-
fessional specialty groups, and third party payers. The federal government,
for example, is charged with developing "clinically relevant guidelines" 6
through the Office of the Forum for Quality and Effectiveness within the
Agency for Health Care Policy and Research "to enhance the quality, ap-
propriateness, and effectiveness of health care services."' Professional spe-
cialty groups, such as the American Society for Anesthesiologists, have cre-
ated guidelines to address risk management issues.2 And, third party
payers, such as managed care plans, have implemented guidelines for par-
20. Arnold J. Rosoff, The Role of Clinical Practice Guidelines in Health Care Reform, 5
HEALTH MATRIX 369, 370 (1995).
21. See id.
22. See iL at 371.
23. See John D. Ayres, The Use and Abuse of Medical Practice Guidelines, 15 1. LEGAL
MED. 421 (1994).
24. Stephen M. Merz, Clinical Practice Guidelines: Policy Issues and Legal Implica-
tions, 19 J. ON QUATY IMPRoVEmwr 306, 307 (1993).
25. See Rosoff, supra note 20, at 374.
26. 42 U.S.C.A. § 299b-l(a) (West 1997).
27. I
28. See Merz, supra note 24, at 308.
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ticipating health care providers."
III. THE FUTURE OF PRACTICE GUIDELINES AND THE STANDARD OF CARE IN
AN ERA OF MANAGED CARE
Courts have only just begun to use practice guidelines to address the
standard of care in medical malpractice litigation. Without much fanfare,
litigants have introduced and courts have approved the use of practice
guidelines to provide evidence of the relevant standard of care." For exam-
ple, in James v. Woolle3 ' the court upheld a finding of negligence in
choosing a vaginal delivery rather than recommending a cesarean section.
The court relied, in part, on the physician's failure to comply with the
American College of Obstetrics and Gynecologists' guideline recommend-
ing a cesarean delivery for babies estimated to weigh more than 4,000
grams. " Similarly, in Pollard v Goldsmith,33 the court found evidence of a
violation of the standard of care in failing to follow the guidelines promul-
gated by the American College of Surgeons' Prophylaxis Against Tetanus
and Wound Management. The guidelines required that patients with
wounds indicating an overwhelming possibility of tetanus must be given
human-immune globulin.'
In these cases, the guidelines functioned much like expert testimony to
inform the court about the nature of existing practice, seemingly one step
removed from the partisanship that often characterizes the presentation of
privately retained experts. Not surprisingly, practice guidelines are deemed
appropriate for this purpose because existing or customary practice is a
central consideration in setting the standard of care in a medical malpractice
claim." Guidelines used in this manner are not binding on the factfinder but
merely shed light on existing practice. Thus, this judicial use of guidelines
seems likely to continue to be accepted by the courts.
One of the reasons that this use of guidelines as evidence of existing
practice is likely to be accepted by the courts is that the guidelines do little
to change existing practice. The standard of care remains case specific,
29. See Rosoff, supra note 20, at 374.
30. See Lori Rinella, Comment The Use of Medical Practice Guidelines in Medical
Malpractice Litigation--Should Practice Guidelines Define the Standard of Care?, 64 U.
Mo. KAN. CrrY L. REV. 337 (1995).
31. James v. Woolley, 523 So. 2d 110 (Ala. 1988).
32. See id at 112.
33. Pollard v. Goldsmith, 572 P.2d 1201 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977).
34. See icL at 1203.
35. See Joseph H. King, Jr., In Search of a Standard of Care for the Medical Profession:
The "Accepted Practice" Formula, 28 VAND. L. REv. 1213 (1975).
36. From an evidentiary standpoint admissibility of these practice guidelines presents
surmountable traditional evidentiary issues. For example, as an out of court statement raising
hearsay concerns, guidelines may be analyzed within the learned treatise exception to the
hearsay rule or as the basis for an expert's opinion exempt from hearsay scrutiny. See Sam A.
[V/ol. 34
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and, concomitantly, health care professionals and the courts remain at a loss
for authoritative guidance as to appropriate health care. Compliance with or
deviation from the guidelines has no direct legal effect because the fact-
finder is free to reject these guidelines. Thus, when a health care provider
resorts to a guideline in resolving patient care issues, it is unclear what legal
effect that decision may have later if a jury should be asked to second guess
that decision in a medical malpractice claim. Accordingly, tlis use of prac-
tice guidelines does little to respond to the failure to provide clear, consis-
tent guidance to health care professionals, lawyers, and the courts.
To address this problem, several states, including Florida," Kentucky,"
Maine,39 and Maryland," have taken a first step by enacting statutory
schemes to adopt and implement practice guidelines designed, among other
things, to play a role in ascertaining the standard of care in medical mal-
practice litigation. While it is unrealistic to expect practice guidelines to
address every clinical decision a physician must make,4 nonetheless they
offer to address a multitude of decisions in a more informed and systematic
fashion. The Maine statutory scheme seems to have been the model for this
approach. In 1992, Maine embarked on a Medical Liability Demonstration
Project that created four medical specialty advisory committees charged
with developing "practice parameters and risk management protocols...
[that] define appropriate clinical indications and methods of treatment."'"
The goal of the project was to reduce the practice of defensive medicine.
Physicians who participate in the project must agree to limit their practice of
defensive medicine, and, in exchange, compliance with these standards is
admissible as an affirmative defense in an action for professional negli-
gence. This legislation is an innovative first step in setting standards of
practice to guide the judiciary and the health care professions.
There are, however, two interesting and interrelated features of the
guidelines that deserve additional attention. First, the legislation permits the
guidelines to be used defensively by physicians to prove compliance with
the standard of care, but not offensively by claimants to prove deviation
from the standard of care. Second, there are no case reports of the use of
these guidelines. Permitting defensive use of the guidelines may well re-
duce incentives to engage in medically unnecessary practices and proce-
dures, although proof of the reduction of unnecessary practices is still un-
McConkey, Note, Simplifying the Law in Medical Malpractice: The Use of Practice Guide-
lines as the Standard of Care in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 97 W. VA. L. Rsv. 491,
510-17 (1995).
37. See FLA. STAT. ch. 408.02 (1996).
38. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 342.035 (Michie 1996).
39. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 2971-2979 (West Supp. 1995).
40. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. I § 19-1602 (1996).
41. See Edward B. Hirshfeld, Should Practice Parameters Be the Standard of Care in
Malpractice Litigation?, 266 JAMA 2886 (1991).
42. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2973 (West 1996).
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clear in the Maine experiment. However, the failure to permit offensive use
of the guidelines undercuts the incentive for physicians to utilize these em-
pirically based decision rules. Where a physician fails to comply with a
relevant guideline and the patient thereby suffers injury, unless the physi-
cian relied on an alternative guideline or can point to more recent research
that would justify a deviation from the guideline, not holding a physician
accountable for failure to follow the guideline encourages exactly the sort of
flawed decision making that the guidelines are intended to avoid.' Moreo-
ver, the absence of mutuality in these guidelines (i.e., permitting only defen-
sive use) raises serious constitutional questions that may chill their use by
defense attorneys who do not wish to jeopardize a verdict with a constitu-
tionally suspect procedure."M If defense attorneys are reluctant to jeopardize
verdicts by using these guidelines defensively, the assurance the guidelines
provide physicians relying on them may be undermined. Yet, it is important
not to let this criticism overshadow the importance of the Maine project.
A significant failure of the current method of case specific analysis of
the standard of care is the absence of crystallized standards to inform health
care professionals what the legal system expects of them, thereby providing
an incentive to practice defensive medicine. The use of practice guidelines
as a way to establish the standard of care has the potential benefit of in-
forming health care professionals of the standards by which they will bejudged. However, some health care professionals fear that practice guide-
lines and the risk of malpractice exposure for failing to follow them, would
unnecessarily limit their discretion and stultify the practice of medicine.
This fear appears to explain Maine's limitation on the offensive use of
guidelines to obtain physician support for the experiment. Moreover, there
will inevitably be a lag between the adoption of guidelines and their incor-
poration into the prevailing practice in the relevant professional community,
particularly when the guidelines are based on research that rejects the effi-
cacy of current treatment approaches."
There has been a lively debate within the health care community about
the utility of practice guidelines intended to improve "decision-making by
detailing appropriate indications for specific medical interventions."'' And,
while many health care professional groups have addressed practice guide-
lines, the pace of their adoption and implementation reflects a profound am-
bivalence about their development and implementation within the health
care community. Yet, practice standards offer health care professionals the
opportunity to play a greater role in setting the standards of care that govern
health care malpractice litigation.
43. See Robyn M. Dawes et al., Clinical Versus Actuarial Judgment, 243 ScIENc 1668
(1989).
44. See Jennifer Begel, Maine Physician Practice Guidelines: Implications for Medical
Malpractice Litigation, 47 ME. L. REV. 69, 88-89 (1995).
45. See Rosoff, supra note 20, at 380.
46. R. Dale Walker et al., Medical Practice Guidelines, 161 W. J. MED. 39, 39 (1994).
[Vol. 34
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Consider, as an example, residency training standards for psychiatry.
The practice in supervision of psychiatry residents ranges from intensive
supervision of each patient a resident treats to no supervision at all for a
portion of a resident's caseload. Often it is left to the discretion of the resi-
dent to choose patients to present to a supervisor. This practice paradoxi-
cally assumes that residents have the clinical sophistication to know with
which patients they need help. Under this system of training, residents can
impress their supervisor by choosing to present only those cases where they
are particularly knowledgeable. Alternatively, residents can present patients
they know their supervisor enjoys working with to gain favor with the su-
pervisor. It is unusual for a program to assign and carefully track each of
the patients that a resident is treating, especially outpatients.
Some supervisors meet with the patients that the resident they are su-
pervising is treating, carefully review and sign notes in the patient's chart,
and regularly review audio and videotapes of the patient's treatment. Other
supervisors hear only a cursory presentation of a patient and never ask for
follow up or look at the patient's chart. Further, some patients being treated
by residents are not aware that they are being treated by a resident, or that
there is a supervisor who is also involved in their treatment.
These differences in supervision are a function of a number of factors,
including health care economics, time demands, and personal style. Un-
doubtedly these factors contribute to natural experimentation that yields
some innovative approaches to supervision. But, what about when a bad
outcome occurs (misdiagnosis or inadequate treatment, patient suicide, pa-
tient harm to a third party, or therapist/resident-patient sexual involvement)
and suit is brought alleging that the risk of harm would have been timely
identified with appropriate supervision? Although supervisors are not
strictly or vicariously liable for the negligent acts of their residents (as an
employer is liable without regard to the employer's fault for an employee's
negligent acts committed within the scope of the employment relationship),
supervisors are liable for the negligent acts of the resident that result from
inappropriate (negligent) supervision.' How is the judge or jury to deter-
mine whether the supervision in a given case was appropriate?
Health care professionals have understandably decried asking lay
judges and juries to arbitrate conflicting technical testimony from partisan
experts that may cloak bad science, personal values masquerading as sci-
ence, or worse, opinions influenced by financial remuneration.4" Have the
health care professions provided the courts with a viable alternative to as-
certain what is adequate supervision? Does a clearly articulated profes-
sional consensus exist to assist courts to resolve the question of what super-
vision is appropriate for a psychiatric resident?
47. See Marshall B. Kapp, Supervising Professional Trainees: Legal Implications for
Mental Health Institutions and Practitioners, 35 Hosp. & COMM. PSYCHIATRY 143 (1984).
48. See Banks Anderson, Jr., The Expert Witness, 97 OPHTHALMOLOGY 1390 (1990).
9
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The Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education
("ACGME"), a private consortium of five prestigious health care organiza-
tions, has promulgated Special Requirements for Residency Training in
Psychiatry.49 Although these privately promulgated standards are not bind-
ing on courts, they may provide courts with a professional consensus to
guide them. Thus, this avoids the need for courts to explore uncharted ter-
ritory, and rely solely on partisan guides chosen by the litigants.
The ACGME's requirements specify that there must be two hours of
individual supervision weekly and that residents must have "sufficient and
high quality supervision."50 Beyond that, however, the requirements fail to
explicate what constitutes sufficient and high quality supervision. Indeed,
this standard seems a bad joke on the tort system's clear but prospectively
useless guidance to act like a reasonable person under the circumstances.
The ACGME requirements are devoid of guidance on questions that courts
are called on to resolve in claims of inadequate supervision: should the su-
pervisor be informed of all patients the resident is treating; should the su-
pervisor review the resident's care of each patient and, if so, how often; and,
should the supervisor observe, in whole or in part, individual therapy ses-
sions in person or require them to be taped and reviewed, in whole or in
part? None of these types of specific questions are addressed in the re-
quirements. As a consequence, when harm occurs, the adequacy of supervi-
sion will be judged, and at least for that case, the standard of practice will be
set exclusively by the judge's or jury's lay assessment of the litigants' com-
peting experts.
Are there compelling reasons to leave these questions for courts and
health care professionals to resolve on a case by case basis? Is it not possi-
ble to specify standards of practice that will address these issues? Would
not standards of practice likely have a beneficial impact on the quality of
care? Is there an absence of research driven professional consensus or an
absence of homogeneity such that standards of practice would artificially
resolve genuine professional disagreements or fail to incorporate the flexi-
bility to account for relevant patient differences? In some instances, indi-
vidual variability may call for guidelines that tolerate deviation or the ab-
sence of research driven professional consensus may call for options that
indicate a number of possibilities, none of which are shown to be superior.
Where that variability is not present and the research reveals no genuine
disagreement, however, there is no reason to permit deviation."
There is professional consensus, for example, that sexual contact be-
tween therapists and patients is improper, and that sexual contact between
49. ACCREDITATION COUNCIL FOR GRADUATE MED. EDUC., SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS FOR
RESIDENCY TRAINING IN PSYCHIATRY (1990).
50. Id.
51. See David M. Eddy, Clinical Decision Making: From Theory to Practice: Designing
a Practice Policy: Standards, Guidelines and Options, 263 JAMA 3077 (1990).
[Vol. 34
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psychiatric residents and patients occurs.' Standards of practice that require
that the supervisor be informed of all patients the resident is treating, and
require review of the resident's care of those patients, are capable of speci-
fication and would likely have a beneficial impact on the quality of care by
alerting the supervisor to potential boundary problems and inappropriate
care. While appropriate review of the resident's care cannot be guaranteed
to identify all such problems, the absence of review can be guaranteed to
identify none.
When specific standards can be articulated and would likely benefit the
quality of care by concisely informing health care practitioners of the most
recent and best research driven answers to questions they now encounter,53
why would the health care professions hesitate to promulgate them? Often,
one of the loudest expressions of concern is that standards of practice would
become judicially enforced norms resulting in an avalanche of malpractice
litigation.' The fear that standards of practice would indiscriminately in-
crease the risk of malpractice litigation is not well taken. Specific standards
clarify for health care professionals and lawyers conduct that is subject to
tort sanctions. Specific standards articulate appropriate practice rather than
leaving health care professionals to rely on the current ambiguous standards
that encourage the practice of defensive medicine and encourage plaintiffs'
lawyers to pursue marginal cases. Thus, rather than increasing the risk of
malpractice litigation across the board, specific standards permit health care
professionals to act unilaterally to decrease the risk of suit by conforming
their practice to these standards.55
Of course, when a specific standard is violated, standards of practice
increase the probability that the health care professional will be found li-
able. But, informing health care professionals and the courts of the stan-
dards and enforcing them is exactly the point of professionally imposed
standards. Health care professionals should be held accountable when they
deviate from relevant empirically grounded professional standards without
good cause, and thereby cause harm to patients. If standards of practice fail
to inform professionals and do not provide judicially enforceable norms,
they are unresponsive to the needs of health care professionals and courts.
It leaves health care professionals uninformed of expectations of them, and
leaves courts to resolve these issues by their own artifices. Rather than
having judges and juries lacking technical sophistication choose what stan-
dard to apply on a case by case basis, based upon a presentation by partisan
experts, is it not better to have the professions articulate their own stan-
52. See Nanette Gartrell et al., Psychiatric Residents' Sexual Contact with Educators
and Patients: Results of a National Survey, 145 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 690 (1988).
53. See Robert H. Brook, Practice Guidelines and Practicing Medicine: Are They Com-
patible?, 262 JAMA 3027 (1989).
54. See John R. Ball, Better Cookbooks Needed to Guide Physicians, HOSPITALS, Nov. 5,
1988, at 96.
55. See Brook, supra note 53.
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dards? Is that not what the courts and the health care professions claim to
want? Perhaps not.
For health care professionals, specific standards of practice mean an
end to business as usual. Without regard to their impact on quality of care
or professional liability, standards of practice limit professional autonomy
and redefine professional turf boundaries. They also risk exposing the lim-
its of a profession's scientific knowledge by demanding research to support
existing practices. Although health care professionals are interested in set-
ting standards of practice to stave off judicial intrusion, when intrusion ap-
pears less imminent, interest in setting or complying with specific, profes-
sionally set standards of practice wanes.' 6
For the courts, professionally determined standards of practice may also
produce mixed results. In one regard, professionally determined standards
respond to a multitude of judicial concerns. Not only on standard of care
issues in malpractice claims, but in a broad range of civil and criminal
cases, courts are regularly faced with questions of the limits of professional
practice for which their training as lawyers provides no special insights: Can
findings from animal studies be used to link drugs to birth defects in hu-
mans?;' Does clinical experience provide a basis for valid predictions of
violent behavior?;58 Are health care professionals able to make valid deter-
minations whether a child has been sexually abused based on the child's
post-event behavior?59 Professional standards assist courts in ascertaining
whether health care professionals have reached a consensus and, if so, who
has that consensual knowledge. While courts have notoriously disregarded
health care professionals' consensus in the past,6' the courts have increas-
ingly sought professional guidance that rises above the din of the adversary
system.6
Health care professionals understandably ask why professional consen-
sus should be not only a floor but a ceiling as well. If professionals are li-
able when they fail to meet these professional standards, should they not be
absolved of liability when they meet these standards? Although profes-
sional consensus defines what courts regard as .necessary and generally de-
fines what courts regard as sufficient, it is not invariably what courts regard
as the measure of sufficiency. An absence of mutuality appears to exist in
judicial acceptance of professional standards as the measure of what is nec-
essary, but occasional hesitation to accept professional standards as the
measure of what is sufficient.
The explanation for this apparent absence of mutuality is found in the
56. See Jennifer B. Marks, Primary Care Screening Practices: Falling Short of Recom-
mendations, 13 CLINICAL DiABETES 54 (1995).
57. See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
58. See, e.g., Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
59. See, e.g., United States v. St. Pierre, 812 F.2d 417 (8th Cir. 1987).
60. See, e.g., Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 880.
61. See, e.g., Daubert, 509 U.S. at 579.
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role courts understand they are to perform in society. In the context of tort
litigation, courts regard themselves as ultimately responsible for articulating
what society expects of each of us. "Courts must in the end say what is re-
quired; there are precautions so imperative that even their universal disre-
gard will not excuse their omission."' The proverbial reasonable person of
negligence law is a vehicle to articulate what society expects of each of us
as we engage in conduct that poses risk to others. While professional cus-
tom defines the behavior of the reasonable professional in the vast majority
of cases, courts fear that absolute deference to professionally imposed stan-
dards risks abrogating that responsibility. Thus, the willingness of courts to
defer to professionally imposed standards as a measure of sufficiency is, in
part, a function of the extent to which courts view these standards. Courts
view them as an altruistic application of a specialized body of knowledge
concerned with enhancing the quality of patient care rather than guild con-
cerns.
Fairness matters in terms of the credibility of the judicial system and
willingness to accept its decisions. Thus, mutuality is desirable through
consistent treatment of violations and compliance with the professional
standards. One way to assuage the courts' concerns with the goals of these
practice standards and to convince them (or legislative bodies considering
comprehensive malpractice reform) to recognize these standards as a ceiling
as well as a floor is to address which groups should promulgate these stan-
dards. The concern that individual specialty groups or managed care or-
ganizations may be more concerned with advancing their own interests
raises the appropriateness of a National Medical Standards Board.6 While
such an entity exacerbates concerns with loss of autonomy, it increases the
likelihood that courts will perceive these practice standards as credible and
uniform, and represent considered professional judgment about enhancing
the quality of patient care.
IV. CONCLUSION
Clinical practice guidelines, like tort litigation, are intended to condemn
substandard care.' What role might clinical practice guidelines play in re-
solving the problem of inadequate guidance to the medical and legal com-
munities about the standard of care and physicians caught in an evolutionary
glitch? Do they offer the possibility of therapeutically harmonizing the
economic realities of medical practice and the standards by which it will be
judged in malpractice litigation?
There is supreme irony in the relationship between the health care pro-
62. The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932).
63. See Lucian L. Leape, Translating Medical Science Into Medical Practice: Do We
Need a National Medical Standards Board?, 273 JAMA 1534 (1995).
64. See Troyen A. Brennan, Practice Guidelines and Malpractice Litigation: Collision
or Cohesion?, 16 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 67 (1991).
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fessions and courts in setting professional standards of practice in malprac-
tice actions. The courts claim that they are not interested in setting health
care professional standards of practice and look to health care professions to
set those standards.6 And, the health care professions claim that they are
interested in setting their own standards of practice without judicial interfer-
encef These goals are congruent, and a visitor from another planet hearing
them and nothing more might conclude that we live an enlightened, harmo-
nious existence in which each profession understands its appropriate role to
contribute to a just, therapeutic society.'
Evidence of this enlightenment is, however, nowhere to be found in late
twentieth century America. Standards for judging appropriate practice tend
to be case specific because the task of developing and applying the standard
of care in professional malpractice cases has fallen to the courts, but courts
have generally been unwilling to crystallize standards that express the col-
lective wisdom of judge and jury decision making in similar cases. And,
courts, which claim not to be interested in setting standards of practice,
regularly do so in particular cases choosing between contrasting normative
standards advanced by opposing experts, and infrequently do so in using
standards that reject apparent health care professional consensus.68 Their
willingness to set standards of practice may stem from their concerns with
the necessity of standards for dispute resolution or the advancement of high
quality care. Furthermore, the health care professions, which claim to be
interested in setting their own standards, often resist setting specific stan-
dards of practice that can be applied by the courts. Their hesitation to set
standards of practice may stem from concerns with economics, autonomy,
malpractice, and exposure of the limits of a profession's scientific knowl-
edge. The stated goals of courts and health care professions in setting pro-
fessional standards of practice that are in theory congruent are in practice
incongruent.
The consequence of this incongruence is significant. It endangers the
65. See Strachan v. John F. Kennedy Mem'l Hosp., 538 A.2d 346, 349 (N.J. 1988) ('If
'procedures' are to be viewed as... indispensable... in the nature of a standard that governs
the medical community... [t]hat is the business of the medical community itself, not of this
Court.").
66. See Howard Greenbaum, Current Standards of Practice in Medicine: The Medical,
Judicial, and Legislative Roles, 7 W. ST. U. L. REV. 3 (1979).
67. See generally DAVID B. WEXLER & BRUCE J. WINICK, LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY
(1996); BRUCE J. WINIcK, THERAPEaTIC JURISPRUDENCE APPLIED: ESSAYS ON MENTAL
HEALTH LAw (1997); DAVID B. WEXLER & BRUCE J. WINICK, ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC
JURISPRUDENCE (1991); DAVID B. WEXLER, THERAPEUiIC JURISPRUDENCE: LAW AS A
THERAPEUTIC AGENT (1990).
68. See Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981, 983 (Wash. 1974) (rejecting the undisputed ex-
pert testimony about professional norms for administering glaucoma tests to people under
forty). But see Jerry Wiley, The Impact of Judicial Decisions on Professional Conduct: An
Empirical Study, 55 S. CAL. L. REv. 345 (1982) (a subsequent study revealed that the court's
decision accurately, although accidentally, reflected the accepted professional practice which
had been incorrectly described by the experts).
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ability of the courts to ascertain and apply the standard of care correctly and
consistently, and concomitantly undermines the public and the health care
professions' confidence in the judicial system. Moreover, it endangers the
ability of the courts to provide health care professionals with clear guidance
on legal norms, thereby enhancing the risk of costly and risky, but medically
unnecessary care. This incongruence is exacerbated by the existence of
managed health care, whose economically driven effects on health care
practice are a separate and often conflicting tension in practice standards. 9
Reflecting the realities of a rapidly disappearing era of health care, juries in
malpractice cases are not instructed to consider economic matters in ascer-
taining the health care professional's duty to the patient. Thus, without
practice standards to guide judicial assessments of professional practice,
health care professionals are caught between the case specific method of
setting of the standard of care that is insensitive to economic considerations
and managed care plans that are driven by economic considerations.
69. See Appelbaum, supra note 13.
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